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Declining Jurisdiction in a Future
International Convention on Jurisdiction
and Judgments-How Can We Benefit
from Past Experiences in
Conciliating the Two Doctrines of
Forum Non Conveniens and Lis Pendens?
GREGOIRE ANDRIEUX*
We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a
problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.
Justice Cardozo'
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the reasons for the success of international arbitration
is that arbitral awards are subject to a widely agreed-upon regime
of recognition and enforcement. One of the most largely ratified
conventions, the New York Convention,2 sets forth a framework
for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, making
* Mr. Andrieux wishes to thank Professor Jay L. Westbrook (University of Texas at
Austin) for guiding and supervising his LL.M thesis on which this article was based. Mr.
Andrieux started law school at the University of Nantes in France, where he completed a
"licence de droit" in 2001. He then spent a year at the University of Ottawa in Canada,
focusing primarily on comparative law. The following year, Mr. Andrieux completed an
advanced degree in Anglo-American business law at the University of Paris 1 La
Sorbonne in Paris, France. In 2003, he graduated from the L.L.M program of the
University of Texas at Austin. Mr. Andrieux,.who is a member of the Paris and New York
bars, is now practicing law in Paris. In the course of his studies, Mr. Andrieux has written
numerous comparative law papers, among them an article published in The Global Jurist
Topics vol. 2, Issue 2 Article 2, 2002, entitled, "Capital Social et Protection des Crdanciers
- Approche Comparative France / Etats-Unis," which was a comparative approach of the
legal capital rules in the United States and in France.
1. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 120 N.E. 198,201 (1918).
2. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
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them more attractive than court judgments that lack such a global
regime.3
Countries have shown an overwhelming reluctance to
establish a system which would automatically deprive them of
important aspects of their sovereignty: the right to adjudicate
pursuant to their jurisdictional rules and to limit the effects on
their territory of a foreign judge's decisions, especially when she is
from an unknown or unapproved jurisdiction. 4 This fear of the
unknown, however, has not barred the conclusion of regional
agreements. Where the other contracting states are well-known
neighbors, countries have been more willing to conclude
agreements whereby foreign judgments could be automatically
recognized and enforced within their territory. The systems
established in the Brussels5 and Lugano 6 Conventions and the
more recent European Community (EC) Regulation are excellent
examples of this practice.7 This regime is, however, limited to the
contracting states and does not solve the problems of enforcing
judgments on a global scale.
Despite their reluctance, countries have for a long time
entertained the idea of an international regime. The Hague
Conference on Private International Law first worked on a treaty
touching on an international regime in 1925.8 A text was achieved,9
but was only partially successful and was merely viewed as a model
for a regional treaty. 10 Later, in 1971, under the auspices of The
Hague Conference, the first Convention on the Recognition and
3. See Patrick J. Borchers, Book Review, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 547, 548 (1996) (writing
that an American company seeking to enforce liability against a French partner is almost
certainly better off with an arbitration award than a court judgment).
4. See Martine Stuckelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague
Conference: The Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 949,952 (2001).
5. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 1972 J.0. (L 299) 32, amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 1413 (1990).
6. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989).
7. Council Regulation No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J.
(L 12) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation No. 44/2001].
8. Actes de la Cinquinme session de la Confdrence de La Haye de Droit
International Priv6 (1925), 332.
9. Id. at 332-44.
10. See Adair Dyer, Synthesis of the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments under
the Hague Conventions and the EEC Convention, 7(i) INT'L LEGAL PRAC. 23, 23 (1982).
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Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters was adopted." Only a few countries - Cyprus (1976), The
Netherlands (1979), Portugal (1983), and more recently Kuwait
(2002) - ratified the Convention. 12 These ratifications were not
given any weight because the countries did not comply with the
Convention's requirements of supplementary bilateral agreements.
The failure of this Convention, which had resulted in its birth,
did not put an end to the idea. Countries have kept in mind that
jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments are governed by
a web of different regimes, whose combination may lead to a vain
struggle for a party seeking justice. A comparison of the laws of
three European countries - the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany - illustrates the complexity of the current enforcement
system and shows the advantages from which parties to a dispute
could benefit, should an international system be successfully
drafted. 13  Such a system would facilitate enforcement and
11. See id.
12. See generally Dyer, supra note 10.
13. See Allan T. Slagel & Barton J. O'Brien, United States, in ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, 4 (Louis Garb & Julian Lew eds., 2003) (explaining types of
enforceable judgments under the Uniform Recognition Act).
In Germany, for instance, judgments granting punitive damages and judgments
awarding excessive damages are not enforceable. See ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS (Louis Garb & Julian Lew eds., 2003). This causes an obvious obstacle to the
recognition and enforcement of American judgments in Germany.
Enforcement of foreign judgments in the United Kingdom is governed by common
law rules and statutory provisions. The application of these laws depends on the country
whose courts have rendered the judgment sought to be enforced in the UK. The statutes
that govern this question are: (1) the Administration of Justice Act 1920 (AJA), which
generally applies to former British colonies and various members of the Commonwealth;
(2) the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (CJJA), which was taken in application
of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions and therefore applies to contracting states; and
(3) the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcements) Act 1933 (FJREA), which applies
to certain Commonwealth and European Nations. The common law rule is that any
foreign judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction for a definite sum of
money that is final and conclusive on the merits, may be enforced at common law absent
fraud or some overriding consideration of English public policy. See Jeremy Carver &
Christopher Napier, United Kingdom, in ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
WORLDWIDE 195 (Charles Platto ed., 1989). This general rule, however, is not absolute,
and the complexity of the British system only weighs in favor of a uniform system.
In comparison, France has a simpler system of enforcing foreign judgments. Although
a certain recognition of foreign judgments is available without any specific procedure (see
Horatia Muir-Watt, Remarques sur les Effets en France des Jugements Etrangers
Ind~pendamment de l'Exequatur, in MELANGES DEDIES A DOMINIQUE
HOLLEAUX, 301 (Litec, 1990)), most cases require a specific procedure (the
"exequatur") for enforcement purposes. But this simplicity does not mean that all foreign
judgments are enforceable in France. Judgments for specific performance, for instance, are
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
recognition, lower their cost, and increase predictability.
Therefore, it would be undeniably profitable and would reduce
international tensions caused by certain national provisions such as
the German rejection of punitive damages, the British refusal to
enforce default judgments, or the French reluctance to enforce
specific performance.
14
In addition, the success of the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions on a regional scale showed that a workable system
could be achieved. These conventions even further enhanced the
need for a global convention by aggravating the gap between the
treatment of judgments rendered by courts of Brussels
Convention's non-contracting states and the treatment of
judgments issued by member states' courts. The American
situation is an example of this gap, as no bilateral or multilateral
conventions are in force between the United States and any other
country on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments.
While American law15 result in globally favorable treatment of
foreign judgments by U.S. courts,f6 a 1988 survey concluded that
the treatment of U.S. judgments abroad was "far from
satisfactory."' 17 This helped demonstrate that countries who are
part of the enforcement and recognition regime created by the
Brussels Convention do not welcome American judgments with
the same enthusiasm.
This situation triggered the 1992 American proposal that the
enforceable only when the remedy would be granted under French law, which means very
seldom and only when money damages are not adequate.
14. See ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS (Louis Garb & Julian Lew eds.
2003).
15. In the United States, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution only
applies to sister states' judgments and does not extend to foreign judgments. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, §1. Nevertheless, under the UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION
ACT, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1962), adopted by a majority of states, U.S. courts recognize and
enforce foreign money judgments in a manner similar to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The U.S. court will treat the foreign judgment as creating a debt whose creditor is the
foreign plaintiff seeking enforcement. The Uniform Act provides that, subject to certain
exceptions, final, conclusive, and enforceable foreign money judgments are conclusive in
the United States. See Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a
Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24
BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 167,173-74 (1998).
16. Virtually every foreign judgment (money judgments, judgments for specific
performance, injunctions, personal status judgments, and punitive damages) is enforceable
in the United States. See Slagel & O'Brien, supra note 13, at United States - 4.
17. Fredrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (1988).
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Hague Conference on Private International Law undertake the
negotiation of a multilateral convention on recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. This proposal was supported 8
and the decision to establish a Special Commission Session to
study the matter was further undertaken a year later in May
1993.19 Participants decided to work on a mixed convention which
included both provisions on recognition and enforcement of
judgments, as well as provisions on jurisdiction. z
18. See Paul R. Beaumont, A United Kingdom Perspective on the Proposed Hague
Judgments Convention, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75 (1998) (describing the British support
given to the U.S. proposal).
19. See Ronald A. Brand, Comparative Forum Non Conveniens and the Hague
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 467, 490 (2002).
20. The problem of exorbitant jurisdiction is one reason why participants decided to
negotiate on both jurisdictional rules and enforcement provisions. Courts are sometimes
faced with procedures seeking enforcement of foreign judgments obtained under certain
jurisdictional rules that they consider totally unreasonable. Similarly, by virtue of these
rules, individuals are placed in uncertain positions to the extent to which they are
amenable to process in foreign courts.
The same approach was taken in the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, which
excluded the application of such provisions from the relations between contracting states.
Different examples may be found among the legal systems of countries previously
examined in this Article:
(1) Jurisdiction based upon the presence of assets in the state. This system was
chosen under the German ZPO § 23, which gave jurisdiction to German courts
over any defendant who owned assets in Germany. See § 23
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] (F.R.G.), available at
http://www.rechtsrat.ws/gesetze/zpo/0001.htm. Considering the great risk of
abuse of such a process (for companies which owned assets in Germany and
even for tourists who may at their greatest misfortune forget a personal asset in
the country), in 1998 the German BGH modified its construction of ZPO § 23
and stated that the provision should be interpreted as including an additional
requirement of reasonable connection between the forum and the dispute.
(2) Jurisdiction based upon nationality. Typically such a system uses the
plaintiff's only connection with the forum to establish jurisdiction over the
dispute. The danger of this provision resides in the fact that virtually anyone in
the world is amenable to process in a French court.
(3) The American and English "tag jurisdiction" rule. The U.S. Supreme Court
approved the validity of asserting jurisdiction based on service of process.
Burnham v. Super. Ct. of California, County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990).
The transient rule is also governing in England. Maharanee of Baroda v.
Wildenstein [1972] 2 Q.B. 283 (Eng. C.A.), except as provided by article 3(2) of
the EC Regulation. Although the application of "tag jurisdiction" by both
English and American courts does not seem to be abusive, the danger of abuse
of this type of basis for jurisdiction is obvious and is seen as exorbitant by civil
law countries.
(4) The "Doing business" rule. American law also applies a standard that
appears exorbitant to other countries: continuous and systematic business
contacts with the forum. Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Most
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Drafting a global regime, in which application will be left to
national courts of different legal traditions, requires innovative
proposals in order to reconcile possibly conflicting theories of
those legal traditions. A number of conflicts between theories of
common law and civil law systems arise from the notion of judicial
discretion. Under the traditional definition of judicial discretion,
"applicable rules confine permissible legal choices within a range
of alternatives, but do not determine 'correct' legal outcomes. A
judge remains free to choose among limited alternatives.,
21
Judicial discretion is defended in common law systems for its
propensity to reach fair outcomes but feared in civil law countries
for the unpredictability it generates. In fact, "[i]f a decision is truly
discretionary, the legal determinates of the outcome are balanced
and variability in outcome is predictable., 22 Therefore, this notion
is the cornerstone of numerous conflicts between common law and
civil law systems. Among these is the opposition between the
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens and the civil law
doctrine of lis pendens.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court having
jurisdiction to stay or dismiss the proceedings where it finds that a
more appropriate alternative forum exists.23 This doctrine is
primarily concerned with a fair administration of justice through
the search for the most appropriate forum. On the contrary, civil
law countries emphasize the need for predictability, and give their
judges discretion to stay the proceedings in situations where the
same case is pending in two different courts. This mechanism
however, referred to as lis pendens24, may lead to unfair outcomes.
Working together on the project of The Hague Convention
on Jurisdiction and Judgments, civil law countries and common
law countries needed to find a compromise between their
apparently conflicting theories on the question of declining
European States see this basis for general jurisdiction as useless and
unreasonable.
21. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 62 (1984).
22. Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the Conundrum
of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493, 496 (1996).
23. See J. James Fawcett, General Report, in J. JAMES FAWCETT, DECLINING
JURISDICTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1995) (discussing the common law
doctrine of forum non conveniens).
24. See generally H61ne Gaudemet-Tallon, Les Regimes Relatifs au Refus d'Exercer
la Competence Juridictionnelle en Matidre Civile et Commerciale: Forum Non Conveniens,
Lis Pendens, 46 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 423 (1994).
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jurisdiction.
Certain difficulties have caused Hague negotiations to slow
down and the focus to be placed on negotiating a narrower
instrument on exclusive choice of court agreements. These
problems though, will not end the idea of, or the need for, a global
regime on jurisdiction and judgments. New proposals are expected
in the future and it is crucial, in this context and in order to assure
that future projects will be successfully adopted within reasonable
timeframes, to anticipate the drafting of key provisions such as the
provisions on declining jurisdiction. This concern is the underlying
raison d'etre of this Article, which aims at answering the following
questions: Was the compromise reached at the Hague between
forum non conveniens and lis pendens acceptable? How does it
compare with an ideal - if any - system? Should it be transposed in
extenso into future projects?
To answer these questions, Parts II and III of this Article will
present the two doctrines of lis pendens and forum non
conveniens, their historical and ideological anchorage, and their
present application. Both doctrines will be addressed successively.
Understanding this background is necessary to apprehend and
answer Part IV of this Article, which asks whether these two
doctrines should be accounted for in an international system. Part
V will attempt to draft a clause for future projects combining the
two doctrines and provide a correlative analysis of the compromise
reached in the Hague Interim Text on jurisdiction and judgments.
Part VI will conclude that even if the Hague Project does not
result in a workable or even generally acceptable convention, the
admirable work already done on this question in the context of the
Hague negotiations should be kept in mind as a valuable basis for
future projects when dealing with the question of declining
jurisdiction.
II. LIMITED JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE CIVIL LAW DOCTRINE
OF LIs PENDENS
The civil law tradition is characterized by the limited
discretion that judges enjoy in their position. Certain provisions of
two civil law countries, Germany and France, illustrate this
characterization. These two countries, however, have come to
recognize the necessity of avoiding parallel litigation and have thus
enabled their courts to decline jurisdiction in strictly-defined
circumstances.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
A. The Limited Discretion Awarded to French and German Courts
Civil law systems are founded on a set of provisions granting
little or no discretion to their courts. The civil law's syllogistic
reasoning, under which the facts of a case are characterized to fit
into a particular provision, leaves little room for factual
consideration.25 Once this reasoning has led to the conclusion that
the court has jurisdiction, that court must then assume the
jurisdiction. The presumption is that the Civil Code has already
judged, thus leaving judges with a purely interpretive authority.
In France, for instance, this can be explained by the historical
distrust of the judiciary, illustrated in the famous saying, "Dieu
nous garde de l'6quit6 des Parlements. ' ' 26 This distrust resulted in
the French Revolution's rigid separation of powers as inspired by
Montesquieu's dictates. 27 These dictates were followed in all
modern democracies but were nevertheless applied differently. In
the American legal system, which is also based on this balance of
powers, the judiciary benefits from a theoretically large discretion.
On the other hand, the French legal system, like most civil law
systems, is based on the assumption that the lawmaking authority
rests in the hands of the legislature and the judge is nothing but its
instrument.28 Accordingly, once the law has given jurisdiction to a
court, it cannot decline jurisdiction for reasons of inconvenience or
inappropriateness. This deeply rooted characteristic of the French
system explains why the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not
received in France. A judge refusing to adjudicate would violate
25. See James P. George, International Parallel Litigation-A Survey of Current
Conventions and Model Laws, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 499, 508 (2002).
26. "May God preserve us from the fairness of the parliaments." Gaudemet-Tallon,
supra note 24, at 424.
27. CHARLES LOUIS DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (David
Wallace Carrithers ed., University of California Press 1977) (1748) (explaining that every
man invested with power is apt to abuse it. Therefore, he based his theory of the
separation of powers on an assertion that only power can restrain power.).
28. It has been argued that on the contrary, it is really the judge who controls. The
instrumental functions assumed by judges put them under no pressure to justify their
decisions. The French decisions of the Cour de Cassation are characterized by their
shortness and lack of motivation. Therefore, what was originally conceived as restraining
the judicial power has in fact increased it. For a discussion on this matter, see Mitchel de
S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System,
104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1332 (1995). Similarly, the actual discretion of American judges in
their adjudicating authority may be debated with regards to the limits placed on judicial
authority by the statutes' restrictive wording.
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the law by committing a denial of justice.29
The German legal system is based on the same assumption.
German civil procedure rules are embodied in the Code of Civil
Procedure (the Zp0 30 ), setting rules which do not provide for
judicial discretion. 31 Once the rules point towards the German
judge as having jurisdiction to hear a case, she is bound to assume
it.3
2
The rejection of forum non conveniens by German law,
however, is not absolute.33 In fact, a similar reasoning as the one
applied in the common law doctrine is found in some strictly
defined areas of international non-contentious proceedings. For
instance, section 47(I) of the German Code of Non-Contentious
Proceedings (the FGG34) allows a court to decide not to appoint a
guardian for an incompetent if the interests of the ward are better
served in an alternative forum.35 The court is hereby given
discretion in determining the best interest of the ward. Likewise,
section 47(11) gives the court discretion to transfer its control over
guardianships to an alternative forum more favorable to the ward's
best interests.36
This mechanism closely resembles the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.37 However, the official position remains that German
law takes no cognizance of forum non conveniens.38 The
circumstances under which German courts are given a certain
29. Article 4 of the Code Civil states that judges may not refuse to judge. One who
would do so would be guilty of denial of justice.
30. See generally ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure] (F.R.G.).
31. See Markus Lenenbach, Antisuit Injunctions in England, Germany and the United
States: Their Treatment Under European Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention, 20
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 276 (1998).
32. See id. at 277; § 36, ZPO.
33. See Dr. Haimo Schack, Germany, in J. JAMES FAWCETT, DECLINING
JURISDICTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (1995).
34. GESETZ UBER DIE ANGELEGENHEITEN DER FREIWILLIGEN GERICHTSBARKEIT
[FGG] [Code of Non-Contentious Proceedings] (F.R.G.).
35. See generally Alexander Reus, Judicial Discretion: A Comparative View of the
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Germany, 16 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 455, 493 (1994); § 47(1) FGG, available at
http://dejure.org/gesetze/FGG/47.html.
36. See Reus, supra note 35, at 493.
37. For another example of a delimited area where German courts can exercise some
discretion, see id. at 492-93. The author explains that the ZPO enables the court, sitting in
proceedings for the appointment of a guardian for an incompetent, to disregard its
statutory jurisdiction and transfer the proceedings to another court in the best interest of
the ward.
38. Zoller/Bearbeiter, ZPO, 22. Aufl., § 328 Rn 119b.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
degree of discretion are narrowly defined and can not be expanded
without breaking the system. 39 The German jurisdictional rules are
commanded by Article 101(1) of the German Constitution (GG)
40
which seeks to assure a predictable determination of jurisdiction
by providing that "[n]o one may be removed from the jurisdiction
of his lawful judge."
41
Despite those apparently strict provisions of French and
German law, both systems have recognized the need to avoid
parallel litigation and have therefore adopted provisions allowing
judges to decline jurisdiction in limited circumstances.
B. Avoiding Parallel Litigation: The German and French Lis
Pendens Rules
Both Germany and France recognize the need to avoid
parallel litigation that contributes to the congestion of courts,
increases litigation costs, and may lead to conflicting outcomes,
thus, leaving the parties in the same position as before the
intervention of the courts.42
1. The German Lis Pendens
Although German law rejects the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, it recognizes the doctrine of lis pendens whereby a
court may decide to decline jurisdiction. Article 261, III of the
ZPO provides that the judge shall dismiss a second action dealing
with (1) the same parties and (2) the same cause of action.43 But
this provision cannot be presented as an exception to the fact that
German courts are left with no discretion. For example, should the
requirements for a lis pendens dismissal be fulfilled, the German
judge has no choice but to dismiss the action." This lis pendens
rule has also been applied by German courts in international
jurisdiction issues,45 but its application varies depending on which
country issued the judgment whose enforcement is sought in
39. See Schack, supra note 33, at 194 (citing Kropholler, in HANDBUCH DES
INTERNATIONALEN ZIVILVERFAHRENRECHTS, para. 208, (Tubingen 1982)).
40. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] (F.R.G.).
41. "Niemand daf seinem gesetzlichen Richter entzogen werden." GG art. 101(1).
42. For a more detailed discussion of the problems of parallel litigation, see infra part
III.
43. § 261, III ZPO, available at http://www.rechtsrat.ws/gesetze/zpo/0253.htm#261.
44. § 36, ZPO.
45. See Schack, supra note 33, at 196 (citing BGH, 16 June 1982 [1982] FamRZ 917;
BGH, 10 Oct. 1985 [1986] NJW 2195).
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Germany.
When dealing with foreign judgments, German judges have
traditionally applied lis pendens and dismissed the case where the
same action between the same parties was pending in a foreign
forum prior to its filing in Germany, provided that the foreign
judgment would be enforceable in Germany.46 The latter
condition, however, is not required by the regime set forth in
Article 27 of the EC Council Regulation.47 Therefore, where the
other forum is another Member State of the Brussels Convention,
German courts must apply the lis pendens theory regardless of
whether or not the judgment will then qualify for recognition in
Germany.
On the contrary, where the other forum is not a contracting
State of the Brussels Convention, German courts still apply the
condition of subsequent enforceability in Germany, but now tend
to modify the consequences of a lis pendens finding. The usual
consequence of lis pendens in German law is the dismissal of the
action. The enforceability condition, however, requires the judge
to consider elements that she may not control, such as the issue of
limitations. To avoid the risk that these jurisdictional games result
in depriving the parties of their day in court, German courts have
tended to suspend the proceedings rather than dismiss them.48
Thus, this is the only discretion they are left with; German courts
can suspend or dismiss the proceedings, but they cannot carry on
with the case.
2. The French "Exception de Litispendance"
Article 100 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure
(NCPC)49 is a lis pendens provision, which is conceived as an
anticipated application of res judicata.50 The French code states
that lis pendens arises when the same dispute is pending before
two competent jurisdictions of the same degree. 5' Where the
French NCPC only requires an element of "same dispute," the
46. See MICHEL FROMONT & ALFRED RIEG, INTRODUCTION AU DROIT
ALLEMAND, REQPUBLIQUE FEDERALE 627 (Editions Cujas 1991).
47. Article 27 of the EC Council Regulation replaces Article 21 of the Convention as
amended by Article 8 of the Accession Convention.
48. See Schack, supra note 33, at 196 (citing OLG Karlsruhe, 15 Dec. 1969 [1970]
FamRZ 410, 412; Geimer, Internationales Zivilprozessrecht (Cologne 1987), para. 2181).
49. Nouveau Code de procedure civile.
50. BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONALE PRIvi 337 (3d. ed. 2000).
51. See id.
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German ZPO sets forth a twofold test of same parties and same
cause of action. Nevertheless, the French condition of "same
dispute" has been understood as implying a condition of identity
of the parties, identity of the object of the dispute, and identity of
the cause of action.52 The French provision is therefore simply not
as self-explanatory as the German provision.
Theoretical discussions have taken place as to the necessity
and appropriateness of the last element.53 Indeed, the cause of
action is constituted by the facts and legal rules that are brought
into the debate. In practice, identity of the cause of action can not
be considered and evaluated by the judge until all factual and legal
elements have been disclosed, that is to say, until the end of the
hearing, and consequently until after an exception of lis pendens
can be invoked. In other words, the lis pendens exception cannot
be examined by the judge until a stage of the hearing at which it is
normally not possible for a party to invoke it.
Interesting though it appears from a theoretical perspective, it
seems that few practical consequences are to be attached to this
argument. The lis pendens exception can be brought by one of the
parties,54 but will only be granted if invoked before the second
forum seized, unless the court first seized is one of a lower
degree.55 Should the parties not invoke lis pendens, the last court
seized can decide on its own to decline jurisdiction.56
This system of "litispendance" experienced a long-standing
acceptance in French domestic law but did not make its way into
private international law until relatively recently. On several
occasions the French Supreme Court ("Cour de Cassation")
expressed its unwillingness to admit that lis pendens could apply in
private international law.57 The last strong rejection of the doctrine
was expressed in 1969 when the court reaffirmed that as a principle
the exception of "litispendance" was not admissible in France
where the case was pending before a foreign court.5 8 This decision
52. See Dalloz Action, PROCtDURE CIVILE (2000), para. 960.
53. See Daniel Ammar, De la Litispendance et de la Connexit en Droit International
Priv6, ou Rester Aveugle et Lier les Mains du Juge, 9 RECUEIL DALLOZ 211,213 (2000).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See PIERRE MAYER & VINCENT HEUZI, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVW 293
(Montchrestien 7th ed., 2001).
58. "[I]1 est de principe que l'exception de litispendance n'est pas reque en France A
raison d'une instance introduite A l'6tranger." Id.
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was the last breath of a dying opposition. In fact, the disaster
caused by the French solution at the level of international
cooperation resulted in a slow evolution which started in the early
1960s.59
In 1962, the French Cour de Cassation in Zins60 opted for a
solution that was more favorable to the recognition of lis pendens
in private international law. This orientation was then given credit
by later cases.6' The 1969 rejection of this change in the law was
widely criticized and advocates of the recognition of the doctrine
in private international law eventually succeeded.62 This success
came in the 1974 Miniera di Fragne63 case in which the court
admitted international lis pendens. The court noted, however, that
the plea was admitted only if the decision rendered abroad could
be recognized in France. The French practice of international lis
pendens is in this sense similar to the German one: the judge must
evaluate a subsequent recognition in France of the foreign
judgment and cannot consider whether or not the French court is
an appropriate forum.64
Although French courts must abide by the law and decline
jurisdiction when the conditions of lis pendens under domestic law
are fulfilled, they have, in international matters, certain discretion
as to whether or not to stay the proceedings.65 They have the
power to refuse to decline jurisdiction even though the conditions
of lis pendens are met.66 Academics support the absence of a
59. See YVON LOUSSOUARN & PIERRE BOUREL, DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE
549 (Dalloz 6th ed., 1999).
60. Cass. le. civ., May 5, 1962, D. Jur. 1962, 718.
61. Civ. 1 9 d6c. 1964, [1966] Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 72; Paris 3 juin 1966, [1967] Rev. crit.
dr. int. pr. 734; Cass. le. civ., Dec. 9, 1964, 734.
62. See, e.g., Dominique Holleaux, La Litispendance Internationale, TRAVAUX DE
COMITt FRANCAIS DE DRO1T INTERNATIONAL PRIVf- 203, 203 (1971-73) (encouraging
an abandonment of the Cour de Cassation's repeated rejection of lis pendens in
international matters).
63. Cass. le. civ., Nov. 26, 1974, Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 1975; see also Holleaux, in
BERTRAND ANCEL & YVES LEQUETTE, LES GRANDS ARRIETS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE
FRANQAISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 520 (4th ed. 2001).
64. See Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 24, at 423-27.
65. See H61ne Gaudemet-Tallon, France, in J. JAMES FAWCETT, DECLINING
JURISDICTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 181 (1995). This remark, however,
excludes cases governed by the EC Regulation, which does not give this power to the
courts.
66. See id.; see also H61ne Gaudemet-Tallon, La Litispendance Internationale dans la
Jurisprudence Franqaise, in MtLANGES DtDItS A DOMINIQUE HOLLEAUX 121 (Libraire
de la Cour de Cassation 1990).
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mandatory denial of jurisdiction 67 and encourage the extension of
the EC Regulation solution, namely that the consequence of lis
pendens be suspension of the action and not dismissal.
III. BROAD JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN DECLINING JURISDICTION:
THE LONG-TIME PRACTICE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN
COMMON LAW
It is generally accepted that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens was born in Scotland in the seventeenth century. The
practice then spread to other common law countries such as the
United States and England. While the modern doctrines of forum
non conveniens all derived from the same source, the doctrine has
not been uniformly applied between the United States and
England.
A. The Scottish Genesis
The exact origin of forum non conveniens remains obscure.
Some have said that it was originally borrowed from continental
practice.69 It is, however, commonly agreed that the doctrine's
genesis is to be found in Scottish cases of the seventeenth century
dealing with the notion of forum non competens. 70 A decision of
the Texas Supreme Court, tracing the history of the forum non
conveniens doctrine, stated that "[t]he Scottish courts recognized
that the plea of forum non competens applied when to hear the
case was not expedient for the administration of justice.,
71
Therefore, the idea behind this concept of forum non competens
was clearly the same rationale as the one that subsequently
resulted in the development of the concept of forum non
conveniens. The nineteenth-century Scottish case of Longworth v.
Hope makes this clear by stating that:
"[The plea of forum non competens] does not mean that the
67. See LOUSSOUARN & BOUREL, supra note 59, at 549.
68. See AUDIT, supra note 50, at 339.
69. See Joseph Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. REV. 867, 881 (1935)
(noting that although the use of forum non conveniens was probably borrowed from
continental practice, the doctrine does not appear to be directly traceable to Roman or
continental law).
70. See Vernor v. Elvies, 1610 Sess. Cas. (2nd Div.) (Scot.), reprinted in Decisions of
the Court of Session No. 5 (William Maxwell Morison ed., 1803); see also Col. Brog's Heir
v. - .... 1639 Sess. Cas. (2nd Div.) (Scot.), reprinted in Decisions of the Court of Session
No. 28 (William Maxwell Morison ed., 1803).
71. Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674,676 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1990).
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forum is one in which it is wholly incompetent to deal with the
question. The plea has received a wider signification, and is
frequently stated in reference to cases in which the Court may
consider it more proper for the ends of justice that the parties
should seek their remedy in another forum."
72
The use of the term forum non competens for cases where
jurisdiction could not be contested was a source of confusion. The
use of the term did not clearly distinguish between dismissals
based on lack of jurisdiction (forum non competens) and
dismissals based on the discretion of the court in spite of a finding
of jurisdiction (forum non conveniens). Consequently, the term
"forum non conveniens" was invented in Scottish legal discourse at
the end of the nineteenth century to solve this difficulty. 3
Despite this Scottish genesis, and the deep influence of civil
law on the Scottish legal system,74 the doctrine of forum non
conveniens was rejected by civil law countries and has only been
echoed in common law systems.75
B. The U.S. Experience
The United States witnessed an independent development of
forum non conveniens. Indeed, without using the Latin locution,
early American courts recognized that in certain cases they had76
the discretion to refuse jurisdiction. Thus, in Great Western
Railway Co. v. Miller, the court held as follows:
"We think that when by the pleadings, or upon the trial, it
appears that our tribunals are resorted to for the purpose of
adjudicating upon mere personal torts committed abroad,
between persons who are all residents where the tort was
72. Longworth v. Hope, 3 Sess. Cas. M. 1049, 1053 (Scot. 1865).
73. See Brand, supra note 19, at 469 n. 7, 8.
74. For a discussion about the mixed characteristics of the Scottish legal system, see
Robin Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and the Myth of the Genius
of Scots Private Law, 114 L.Q.R. 228 (1998). The author explains that the unsuccessful law
teaching in early Scottish universities led lawyers to go to continental Europe in order to
complete their education. Thus, through a process of 'reception', Roman law replaced
indigenous law as the law of the land. Id. at 230. However, the cultural shift in Scotland
towards England at the beginning of the nineteenth century explains why English common
law started becoming attractive. This resulted in the mixed legal system known in
Scotland. Id. at 232.
75. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Providing Judicial Review for Decisions by Political Trustees,
15 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 32 (2004).
76. See Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L.
REV. 380, 387 (1947).
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committed, the inconveniences and the danger of injustice
attending the investigation of such controversies render it
proper to decline proceeding further."
The phrase forum non conveniens was not expressly used, but
the rationale was already present. In the 1817 case of Gardner v.
Thomas, while Justice Yates recognized that the court had
jurisdiction to hear a case in which both parties were foreigners, he
had previously stated that he was "inclined to think it must, on
principles of policy, often rest in the sound discretion ofthe court
to afford jurisdiction or not, according to the circumstances of the
case."
78
The phrase forum non conveniens was not commonly used in
American law until Wall Street lawyer Paxton Blair dedicated an
entire article to the doctrine in 1929.79 Blair noted that only a few
American cases used the Latin phrase. 80 However, this did not
restrain him from asserting that American courts were familiar
with the practice. Blair learnedly illustrated his assertion by
writing that:
"[u]pon an examination of the American decisions illustrative
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it becomes apparent
that the courts of this country have been for years applying the
doctrine with such little consciousness of what they were doing
as to remind one of Moliere's M. Jourdain, who found he had
been speaking prose all his life without knowing it."
81
The expansion of the doctrine that followed Blair's article was
so great that in 1941, Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baltimore &
Ohio Railway Co. v. Kepner described the doctrine as a
manifestation of "a civilized judicial system... firmly imbedded in
our law.",82 The year 1948 witnessed the first official recognition of
the common law doctrine by federal courts in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert.83 Although Gilbert was a domestic forum non conveniens
case, it became a basis for granting dismissals in both domestic and
77. Great W. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305, 315-16 (1869).
78. Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134, 138 (N.Y. 1817).
79. See generally Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-
American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929).
80. Id. at 2.
81. Id. at 21-22.
82. Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co. V. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1941).
83. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
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transnational cases.8 4 The court was dealing with an action brought
in the federal district court of New York by the owner of a public
warehouse in Virginia. 5 The plaintiff sought to recover damages
for the destruction of his property by fire caused by the
defendant's negligence. 6 The defendant relied on forum non
conveniens, arguing that Virginia was the appropriate place for
trial.87 Over Justice Black's dissent, the majority upheld the district
court's dismissal of the action on grounds of forum non
conveniens.88 But according to Justice Black, recognizin A the
doctrine amounted to frustrating the legislative purpose. He
wrote, "[t]o engraft the doctrine of forum non conveniens upon the
statutes fixing jurisdiction and proper venue in the district courts
in such actions, seems to me to be far more than the mere filling in
of the interstices of those statutes." 90 The majority's opinion was
that the existence of proper jurisdiction merely permits the court
to decide the case and fails to give the plaintiff a privilege to sue in
the forum.9'
The Court created a two-prong test to determine when a case
should be dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens. The first
prong is that the Court must determine the existence of an
alternative forum.92 In the Court's own words, "it presupposes at
least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process. 93
The second prong involves a balancing of private and public94
interest factors. Examples of private interest factors include:
"the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
84. See David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: "A
Rather Fantastic Fiction", 103 L.Q.R. 398, 400 (1987).
85. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 502.
86. Id. at 502-03.
87. Id. at 503.
88. Id. at 512.
89. See id. at 515, 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
91. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 506.
92. See Peter J. Carney, International Forum Non Conveniens: "Section 1404.5"- A
Proposal in the Interest of Sovereignty, Comity, and Individual Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
415, 426 (1995).
93. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507.
94. See id. at 508.
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expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to
the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained."
9 5
Public interest factors include administrative ease,
reasonableness of the burden on a jury with no relation to the
litigation, propriety of trying a diversity case in a forum that is
accustomed to applying the relevant state law, and the local
interest in having local disputes decided at home.96
These public and private interest factors were not intended to
be exhaustive. 97 The Gulf Court merely sought to establish an
illustrative list rather than a catalogue of circumstances requiring
dismissal. It left a great degree of discretion for the courts in
examining forum non conveniens cases. This balancing test is also
accompanied by a presumption in favor of the plaintiff.98 Indeed,
the court stated that "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed."99
In Gulf, the New York District Court had jurisdiction because
service of process was made upon a company's agent in New
York.'00 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court found that the balancing
of public and private interest factors weighed in favor of granting
the dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens.1° 1 The Court
found that neither the parties nor any witnesses lived in New
York. Additionally, none of the events connected with the action
took place in that state.0 2
The federal forum non conveniens doctrine was further
developed with the enactment of section 1404(a), which provides
that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought." 10 3 The
enactment of this section was a response to the Supreme Court's
Gulf decision and expressed a congressional intent to make
transfers more common and lower the burden on defendants.10 4
95. Id.
96. See Carney, supra note 92, at 426-27.
97. See id. at 427.
98. See id.
99. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508.
100. Id. at 503.
101. See id. at 512.
102. Id. at 509.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).
104. See Carney, supra note 92, at 428.
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There are several differences between forum non conveniens
and section 1404(a). Unlike a motion for dismissal on grounds of
forum non conveniens, which may only be invoked by the
defendant, a section 1404(a) motion can be brought by either
plaintiff or defendant10 5 Another difference is found in the
consequences of the motion. Whereas a finding of forum non
conveniens results in the dismissal of the case, a granting of a
section 1404(a) motion only transfers the case to another district
court.10 6 Such transfers, however, may only be granted where the
alternative forum is another district court.1 7 Therefore, its use has
no impact in international matters where the alternative forum is a
foreign court.
The leading case for the application of forum non conveniens
in international litigation is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno. °8 The
pilot and five passengers of a small aircraft died when it crashed in
Scotland.'0 9 All the decedents were Scottish residents, but the suit
was brought in the United States by the administratrix of the
estates for the admitted purpose of taking advantage of more
favorable laws regarding liability and damages."0 The district
court granted the defendants' motion for dismissal on grounds of
forum non conveniens.1"' It applied a "most suitable forum" test
and concluded that both public and private interest factors favored
Scotland as the appropriate forum despite the unfavorable Scottish
law. 112 The court of appeals reversed the decision, holding that
dismissal should not be granted where the law of the alternative
forum is less favorable to the plaintiff." 3 The Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's decision and held that "plaintiffs may
[not] defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would
be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs
than that of the present forum."' 14 The Court noted that a contrary
solution would congest the courts by making them even more
105. See id. at 429.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 428.
108. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
109. Id. at 239.
110. Id. at 239-40.
111. Id. at 241.
112. Id. at 242-44.
113. Id. at 244.
114. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 247.
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attractive to foreign plaintiffs.' 15 The Court held, however, that "if
the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly
inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the
unfavorable change in law may be given substantial weight."' 6 In
this case, the Court found that the remedies provided by the
Scottish forum were not inadequate." 7 Scottish law did not
provide for strict liability, but this did not amount to depriving the
plaintiffs of any remedy.
18
Gulf and Piper constitute the last major developments of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens in the United States. Both cases
fashioned a doctrine which makes the question of declining
jurisdiction "the product of some intangible balance of
innumerable factors." 119
C. The British Application of the Doctrine
The Scottish doctrine was first exported to the United States,
but also made its way into English law during the twentieth
century.120 This evolution required a strong change in policy. Lord
Mansfield in Mostyn v. Fabrigas expressed the earlier British
position regarding the availability of English courts to foreign
plaintiffs 12' by writing that "it is impossible there ever could exist a
doubt, but that a [foreign] subject... has as good a right to appeal
to the King's Courts of Justice, as one who is born within the
sound of Bow Bell.' ' 122 One possible explanation for this assertion
is that English courts did not have the court congestion problems
that led American courts to develop corrective devices allowing
for jurisdictional decline.12 3 Another reason arises from the judicial
"chauvinism" of English courts. This is illustrated by Lord
Denning's comment in The Atlantic Star case that "if the forum is
England, it is a good place to shop in, both for the quality of the
115. !d. at 252.
116. Id. at 254.
117. Id. at 254-55.
118. Id. at 255.
119. Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 841 (1985).
120. See Brand, supra note 19, at 470.
121. The foreign plaintiffs in this case were residents of the Island of Minorca. Id.
122. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1027 (K.B. 1775).
123. See Robertson, supra note 84, at 409.
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goods and the speed of service.'
' 24
It was clear for a long time that a litigant bringing an action
before an English court would not be easily deprived of this
opportunity. Lord Justice Scott asserted this position in a
statement which embodied English Law until 1974:121
"The true rule about a stay under section 41... may I think be
stated thus: (I) A mere balance of convenience is not a
sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of
prosecuting his action in an English Court if it is otherwise
properly brought. The right of access to the King's Court must
not be lightly refused. (2) In order to justify a stay two
conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other
negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the Court that the
continuance of the action would work an injustice because it
would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse
of the process of the Court in some other way; and (b) the stay
must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden
of the proof is on the defendant."
' 1 6
As a consequence of this strict position, dismissals were
refused regardless of the lack of connection between the parties or
the action and England.
127
Decades later, The Atlantic Star decision diluted the
"vexatious and oppressive" test of St. Pierre and replaced it with a
more liberal approach based on abuse of process. 128 Although the
court in The Atlantic Star denied a general recognition of forum
non conveniens, this opinion together with the McShannon 29 case
in 1978, revolutionized the law and demonstrated an increasing
consideration for the foreign element.' 30 The court in MacShannon
ended the restrictive possibilities of staying an action on abuse of
process and Lord Diplock reformulated Justice Scott's test:
124. Owners of the Motor Vessel "Atlantic Star" v. Owner of the Motor Vessel "Bona
Spes," 1973 Q.B. 364, 382 (Eng. C.A.).
125. See Alan Reed, To Be or Not to Be: The Forum Non Conveniens Performance
Acted Out on Anglo-American Courtroom Stages, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 31, 83
(2000).
126. St. Pierre v. S. Am. Stores (Gath and Chaves), Ltd., 1936 1K.B. 382, 398 (Eng.
C.A.).
127. See Maharanee of Baroda, [1972] 2 Q.B. at 283.
128. The Atlantic Star, 1973 Q.B. at 382.
129. MacShannon v. Rockware Glass, Ltd., 1978 A.C. 795 (appeal taken from Eng.
C.A.).
130. See Aarif Barma & David Elvin, Forum Non Conveniens: Where Do We Go from
Here?, 101 L.Q.R. 48, 52 (1985).
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"In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one
positive, the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the
court that there is another forum to whose jurisdiction he is
amenable in which justice can be done between the parties at
substantially less inconvenience and expense, and (b) the stay
must not deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate personal or judicial
advantage which would be available to him if he invoked the
jurisdiction of the English court."131
Both McShannon and The Atlantic Star pointed out the need
for greater consideration of the "appropriateness" element.
32
Thus, the doctrine changed from the restrictive "abuse of process"
test to the broader "most suitable forum" test. The court in the
Abidin Daver case recognized this evolution in Lord Diplock's
statement that "judicial chauvinism has been replaced by judicial
comity to an extent which I think the time is now ripe to
acknowledge frankly is... indistinguishable from the Scottish legal
doctrine of forum non conveniens.' ' 133 The court thereby
confirmed the de facto incorporation of the Scottish doctrine into
English law and established the test for stays based on forum non
conveniens. This test was formulated as a "balancing of all the
relevant factors on either side, [private and public,] those
favouring the grant of a stay on the one hand and those militating
against it on the other.'
134
Along with this development came the assimilation of Order
11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and stay cases. 135 Until the
1973 Atlantic Star case, the issue of declining jurisdiction in
England arose in two different contexts: motions brought by
defendants to stay proceedings under the St Pierre test, and
plaintiffs' applications under Order 11 for leave to serve process
on defendants outside Great Britain. 36 The Atlantic Star court
started the assimilation of both regimes. This process was finalized
in the House of Lords decision in Spiliada Maritime Corp. v.
Cansulex Ltd. 137 This case involved both a motion to stay the
proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens and a motion to
131. MacShannon, 1978 A.C. at 795.
132. See Barma & Elvin, supra note 130, at 53.
133. The Abidin Daver [1984] 1 A.C. 398,411 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
134. Id. at 419.
135. See The Atlantic Star, 1973 Q.B. at 382; see also Spiliada Maritime Corp. v.
Cansulex Ltd., [1987] 1 A.C. 460,476 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
136. See Robertson, supra note 84 at 410.
137. See Spiliada Maritime Corp., [1987] 1 A.C. at 476.
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set aside a leave to serve defendant out of the jurisdiction under
Order 11.138 In his decision, Lord Goff held that the criteria for
both stay applications and for Order 11 applications were
identical. 39 This assimilation is, however, subject to an exception.
For stay applications, the defendant bears the burden of proof; for
applications under Order 11, the onus is on the plaintiff. 140 The
basic principles were summarized by Lord Goff:
"(a) The basic principle is that a stay will only be granted on the
ground of forum non conveniens where the court is satisfied
that there is some other available forum, having competent
jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the
action, i.e. in which the case may be tried more suitably for the
interests of all the parties and the ends of justice.
(b)... [I]n general the burden of proof rests on the defendant to
persuade the court to exercise its discretion to grant a stay.
(c)... In my opinion, the burden resting on the defendant is not
just to show that England is not the natural or appropriate
forum for the trial, but to establish that there is another
available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate
that the English Forum... I may add that if, in any case, the
connection of the defendant with the English forum is a fragile
one (for example, if he is served with proceedings during a short
visit to this country), it should be all the easier for him to prove
that there is another clearly more appropriate forum for the
trial overseas.
(d)... [Tihe court will look first to see what factors there are
which point in the direction of another forum. . .So it is for
connecting factors... that the court must first look; and these
will include not only factors affecting convenience or expense
(such as the availability of witnesses), but also other factors
such as the law governing the relevant transaction... and the
places where the parties respectively reside or carry on a
business.
(e) If the court concludes at that stage that there is no other
available forum which is clearly more appropriate for the trial
of the action, it will ordinarily refuse a stay.
138. Reed, supra note 125, 85.
139. Id. at 86.
140. Id.
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(f) If however the court concludes at that stage that there is
some other available forum which prima facie is clearly more
appropriate for the trial of the action, it will ordinarily grant a
stay unless there are circumstances by reason of which justice
requires that a stay should nevertheless not be granted. In this
inquiry, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case,
including circumstances which go beyond those taken into
account when considering connecting factors with other
jurisdictions... [O]n this inquiry, the burden of proof shifts to
the plaintiff.'
14 1
The court therefore established a two stage inquiry which
requires the judge to determine: (1) another forum which is clearly
more appropriate, and (2) whether the requirements of justice
nevertheless require that a stay be granted. 42 This statement of
the law was recently confirmed by the House of Lords in Lubbe v.
Cape PLC.143 The defendant, Cape Industries PLC, ran asbestos
operations in South Africa.1 44 More than 3,000 plaintiffs sued the
corporation for wrongful deaths and injuries resulting from
exposure to asbestos.' 5 Cape Industries moved for a stay on
grounds of forum non conveniens, arguing that the appropriate
forum was South Africa. 146 Basing its opinion on the Spiliada test,
the trial judge held that the action was distinctly more related to
South Africa and stayed the proceedings. 47 The House of Lords
confirmed that, based on the Spiliada test, England was not the
natural forum. 148 The court held, however, that under the
circumstances, justice required that the stay should not be
granted. 149 Considering the lack of legal aid funds 150 and the
inexperience of the South African forum in handling group
actions, it was unlikely that the plaintiffs would obtain justice.
141. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 11987] 1 A.C. at 476-78.
142. See PETER NORTH & JAMES FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 336-47 (13th ed. 1999).
143. Lubbe v. Cape PLC., [20001 1 W.L.R. 1545, 1561 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.).
144. Id. at 1550.
145. Id. at 1549.
146. Id. at 1561.
147. Id. at 1551.
148. See id. at 1559.
149. Lubbe, [2000] 1 W.L.R. at 1559.
150. This element had been held to be insufficient by Lord Goff in Connelly v RTZ
Corp. plc [1998] A.C. 854 at 873. He wrote that even in sophisticated legal systems,
financial assistance for litigation was not necessarily regarded as essential. He illustrated
this assertion by the fact that until 1949 such aid was not widely available in Great Britain.
151. Lubbe, [2000] 1 W.L.R. at 1559.
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Lord Bingham expressed a position which differs from the
American forum non conveniens doctrine in deciding thatpublic
interest considerations have no bearing on the court's decision.1
5 2
More than a century after the first use of the Latin phrase in
Scottish law, the doctrine of forum non conveniens appeared to be
settled in the English legal system. An important restriction,
however, on the use of forum non conveniens by British courts
came into effect only a few months after the Spiliada decision.
5 3
The Brussels and Lugano Conventions and the recent EC Council
Regulation 54 have opted for the civilian solution of lis pendens.1
55
Therefore, the principles established in Spiliada are subject to
certain limitations. The question of whether forum non conveniens
still had a place in English law has been much debated but no
general answer has been reached. 156 It is, however, accepted that
courts have no discretion to decline jurisdiction on grounds of
forum non conveniens where the appropriate forum is in another
Member State. 157 But where the appropriate forum is a Non-
Member State, English courts may still use the doctrine of forum
non conveniens to decline jurisdiction. This solution was retained
by the English Court of Appeals in In re Harrods.158 The court
held that it should stay an action brought against a defendant
domiciled in England on the grounds that the appropriate forum
was the court of a non-member state.159 The case was referred to
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) but was withdrawn because
the suit had been settled. 60  This decision remains very
controversial and criticized for its propensity to affect the
152. Id. at 1561.
153. See Fawcett, supra note 23, at 11.
154. Council Regulation No. 44/2001, supra note 7.
155. Article 27 of the Regulation, which substitutes articles 21 of the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions, states: "Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and
between the same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court
other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time
as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established." Id.
156. See ADRIAN BRIGGS & PETER REES, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS
221-23 (3rd ed. 2002).
157. Id. at 223.
158. In re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd., 1992 Ch. 72 (Eng. C.A.). For an analysis of the
case, see Wendy Kennett, Forum Non Conveniens in Europe, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 552,
561-69 (1995).
159. In re Harrods, 1992 Ch. 72.
160. 1 LAWRENCE COLLINS ET AL., DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
394 (13th ed. 2000).
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harmonization of European law.161 The same issue arose in a more
recent case, 162 but the English Court of Appeals refused to refer
the question to the ECJ, arguing that it would cause expense and
delay. 163 Therefore, the doctrine of forum non conveniens still
applies in England even though its scope has been narrowed to
cases where the alternative forum is not a member state of the
European community.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE INCLUSION OF BOTH DOCTRINES IN
AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS
Why not adopt a Brussels-type convention, which would elect
one of the two doctrines? Such a proposal is unreasonable from
both a political and a legal perspective. Politically, it is apparent
that participating countries would not agree to a convention that
would limit the ability to decline jurisdiction pursuant to their own
respective doctrines. The context of the Hague negotiations is
different than that of the Brussels Convention. The Brussels
Convention was originally negotiated and signed exclusively by
countries of civil law tradition who did not include a provision on
forum non conveniens,164 whereas the Hague negotiations are
taking place between countries which strongly practice both fis
* pendens and forum non conveniens. Therefore, the solution could
not be a Brussels-type one of opting exclusively for either one of
the two doctrines. Such a solution would be undesirable from a
legal standpoint, too, since both doctrines are admittedly imperfect
but undeniably necessary for a proper administration of justice.
161. See id. at 393-95.
162. Hamed el Chiaty & Co. v. The Thomas Cook Group Ltd. (The "Nile Rhapsody"),
[1994] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 382 (Eng. C.A. 1993).
163. See id. at 392.
164. The Brussels Convention was originally negotiated and signed exclusively by
countries of civil law tradition. Therefore, the countries did not include a provision on
forum non conveniens. When the United Kingdom and Ireland entered into the European
Community, their attempts to add a forum non conveniens provision remained
unsuccessful.
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A. The Case for a Lis Pendens Provision: Avoiding Parallel
Litigation
1. The Problems of Parallel Litigation
As mentioned earlier, lis pendens rules in civil law countries
are intended to avoid the costs of parallel litigation, both in terms
of time and money, for the parties and for the judicial systems.
Parallel litigation is wasteful in the sense that the parties have to
present their case twice. Evidence must be duplicated. Witnesses
must appear in both courts. If experts are needed, the parties must
pay for them to appear in the other court, or find and remunerate
other experts to testify in the second court. In addition, each
litigant must bear increased representation costs, traveling
expenses, and the psychological effects of being a party to a
dispute. This duplication is a burden not only for the litigants, but
also for the courts. The courts of most countries already face
congestion and delay. Parallel litigation only increases these
difficulties.
Parallel litigation also raises the question of judgment
consistency. If the two parallel proceedings were to reach a
consistent outcome, the successful resolution of the dispute could
help erase the concerns over the waste created by parallel
litigation. A major problem, however, arises when the two courts
apply different legal solutions and thus reach conflicting
judgments. In such instance a new dispute is likely to arise, thus,
worsening the waste of time and money.
Therefore, an international regime on jurisdiction and
enforcement of judgments must set forth a mechanism to prevent
these problems of parallel litigation.
2. The Lis Pendens Mechanism: A Solution to the Problem?
Advocates of the forum non conveniens doctrine recognize
the necessity of avoiding useless litigation when a case is pending
before two jurisdictions at the same time. They point out, however,
that lis pendens encourages a "race to the courthouse."' 65 As
previously mentioned, under lis pendens, the second court seized
must stay its proceedings until the first court seized establishes
jurisdiction. Thus, natural defendants might be tempted to race to
165. See Peter E. Herzog, Brussels and Lugano, Should You Race to the Courthouse or
Race for a Judgment?, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 379 (1995).
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bring an action in a certain jurisdiction in order to block the action
of the natural plaintiff in the appropriate forum. Common law
countries argue that a system allowing courts to consider certain
notions of fairness and proper administration of justice will correct
this dysfunction. Therefore, criticism addressed to systems such as
the French and German is not directed at the notion of lis pendens
itself, but rather to the fact that the systems are based solely on
this doctrine. The presence of lis pendens in the Hague
compromise was not very controversial as long as it was balanced
by a mechanism allowing the courts to avoid certain abuses.
Another problem of the "first-to-file" rule lies in international
incoherence when countries apply definitions differently. For
instance, as previously mentioned the French and German rules on
lis pendens are similar in definitional terms. 66 But the French rules
are not favorable to German courts because German law defines
the pendency of a claim and the filing of the complaint
differently. 67 Under German law, pendency takes effect only
when the defendant has been served with process. 68 On the
contrary, most countries, like France, consider that the pendency
of the claim takes effect when it is filed. 169 Consequently, this may
create problems in international litigation where a certain time
elapses between the filing of the complaint and the serving of the
process on the defendant. For instance, a complaint may be filed
first in Germany, then in France before process has been served in
Germany, and still be considered to be pending first in France. The
German court would consequently have to suspend or dismiss the
German action.
Therefore, providing for a lis pendens provision in an
international regime would require a generally acceptable
definition of its elements, such as the basic definition of pendency,
in order to achieve international coherence and uniformity.
166. See Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 65, at 181.
167. See Dr. Anke Freckmann & Dr. Thomas Wegerich, THE GERMAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 151 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) (discussing the difference between Anhangigkeit
and Rechtshangigkeit; the filing of the complaint and the pendency of the claim).
168. § 261 Nr. 1-3 ZPO (F.R.G.), translated in GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE & CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH 257 (Charles E. Stewart trans., 2001).
169. See generally Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 65, at 181.
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B. Forum Non Conveniens in the International Compromise:
Searching for the Most Suitable Forum
1. Presentation of the Critiques of Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens has been criticized for
its "numerous inherent vices. ' ' 170 The main critique of the doctrine,
which best explains why fervent proponents of lis pendens dislike
forum non conveniens, is that it endangers civil law's cherished
certainty and predictability.17' In the 1947 case that recognized the
doctrine in the United States, Gulf Oil Corp., Justice Black's
dissent foresaw that "[t]he broad and indefinite discretion left to
federal courts to decide the question of convenience from the
welter of factors which are relevant to such a judgment, will
inevitably produce a complex of close and indistinguishable
decisions from which accurate prediction of the proper forum will
become difficult, if not impossible."'
7 2
The relevance of Black's prediction, which was based on a list
of eleven factors that the Court established, is reinforced today as
subsequent decisions have increased the list.173 The best practical
illustration of this chaos is the embarrassing fact that different
courts dealing with similar fact patterns may happen to reach
conflicting outcomes. 74 Therefore, the fear of unpredictability
resulting from the application of the present forum non conveniens
doctrine appears to be justified.
Another critique of forum non conveniens, which is related to
the first critique, is that trial courts are granted too much
discretion. 75 The forum non conveniens test gives wide discretion
to courts in searching for the most appropriate forum among
several which may all have an interest in deciding the case.
170. See Hu Zhenjie, Forum Non Conveniens: An Unjustified Doctrine, 48 NETH. INT'L
L. REV. 143, 152 (2001).
171. American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) (Justice Scalia
recognized the problem and wrote: "[t]he discretionary nature of the doctrine, combined
with the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application,..., make uniformity
and predictability of outcome almost impossible.").
172. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).
173. See Harry Litman, Comment, Considerations of Choice of Law in the Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 74 CAL. L. REV. 565, 575-76 (1986) (providing an example of
California where the list has been extended to 25 factors).
174. See David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: "An
Object Lesson in Uncontrolled Discretion," 29 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 353, 360 (1994).
175. Zhenjie, supra note 170, at 118.
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American decisions on forum non conveniens are rarely reversed
for abuse of discretion "when [the court] has dutifully recited the
Gulf Oil factors and stated a conclusion."1 76 A mere statement by
the court that a balance of private and public interests supports its
holding will generally suffice. Therefore, the fairness sought by the
doctrine may be affected by this lack of true judicial review.
The doctrine has also been criticized for its tendency to assist
multinational corporations to free themselves of claims by foreign
plaintiffs. Justice Lloyd Doggett's dissent in Dow Chemical Co. v.
Castro Alfaro177 expressed this critique in the following terms:
To accomplish the desired social engineering, they must invoke
yet another legal fiction with a fancy name to shield alleged
wrongdoers, the so-called doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The refusal of a Texas corporation to confront a Texas judge
and jury is to be labeled 'inconvenient' when what is really
involved is not convenience but connivance to avoid corporate
accountability.
1 78
The doctrine of forum non conveniens does not by itself mean
that foreign plaintiffs are deprived of their day in court. Parties
who face a forum non conveniens dismissal may still bring the case
in the appropriate forum. Nevertheless, dismissal of their claim by
application of the doctrine is often outcome determinative.'79 The
result from dismissals is that multinational corporations are not
judged according to their own country's standards. Thus, wrongful
acts by multinational corporations remain unpunished and victims
uncompensated. In re Union Carbide Corporation Gas Plant
Disaster presents a controversial illustration of this problem. 80 In
December 1984, India faced a disaster when a chemical plant
leaked deadly gas which caused the death of thousands of
inhabitants of a Bhopal suburb.' 8 1 Class actions were brought in
the United States and were eventually consolidated in a New York
176. See Stein, supra note 119, at 832.
177. See generally Dow Chem. Co., 786 S.W.2d at 674 (rejecting the application of the
forum non conveniens doctrine in personal injury actions brought under the Wrongful
Death Act).
178. Id. (Doggett, J., dissenting).
179. See Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine
of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL. L. REV. 650, 671
(1992).
180. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
181. Id.
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district court, which dismissed the suit on grounds of forum non
conveniens.'82 The court found that the balance of public and
private interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal, which was
upheld by the appellate court.1 83 The case did not go to trial in
India and was settled far below the $250 billion claimed, leaving
many of the victims uncompensated. 184 The unfairness of the
outcomes in such cases and the reduced liability of multinational
corporations have been used as an argument against the forum
non conveniens doctrine.
Another criticism of the doctrine is the discrimination it
implies between foreign and national plaintiffs.185 This is seen in
Piper Aircraft, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is
reasonable to assume that a plaintiff's choice of his national forum
is convenient, whereas this assumption is less reasonable where a
foreign plaintiff chooses the U.S. forum. 86 This critique does not
touch upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens itself but rather
upon one aspect of the court's application. The relevance of this
critique will also be discussed in the next part.
Yet another critique of the forum non conveniens doctrine
relates to its relevance in today's world. The doctrine was born to
avoid the undue hardship potentially imposed on litigants by the
inconvenience of the forum where the suit was brought. 87 The
inconvenience was greater as transportation and communication
were limited in those times. For example, it was noted that when
the 1947 U.S. Supreme Court Gulf Oil Corp. decision was
rendered, "[w]e had no commercial jet travel, no personal or office
computers, no photocopy technology, [and] no fax machines.9
1 88
This reasoning explains Judge Oaks' dissenting opinion that "[olne
may wonder whether the entire doctrine of forum non conveniens
should not be reexamined in the light of the transportation
revolution that has occurred since then.' 89 The legitimacy of this
critique increases, especially considering that nowadays witnesses
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards Translational Corporate Accountability in the
Global Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re: Union
Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 299, 303 (2001).
185. See Zhenjie, supra note 170, at 159-60; see also Litman, supra note 173, at 575-76.
186. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256.
187. See Robertson, supra note 174, at 367; see also Barrett, supra note 76, at 388.
188. See Robertson, supra note 174, at 367.
189. See Fitzgerald v. Texaco, Inc., 521 F.2d 448, 456 (2d Cir. 1975).
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can be more easily heard and the improvement of international
postal services and electronic transfers has rendered the discovery
procedure less fastidious.
2. Discussion of the Critiques
As mentioned above, the forum non conveniens doctrine was
criticized for the discrimination that its current application
generates between foreign and national plaintiffs.19° When
answering the question of whether this discrimination is
acceptable, national plaintiffs argue that they are more entitled
than foreign plaintiffs to have their disputes heard by their
national courts because they, as citizens, bear the cost of the
judicial services. Taken to the extreme, however, this justification
could lead to an argument that national plaintiffs who do not pay
taxes could be refused access to the courtroom. Rights based on
taxpaying considerations, such as voting rights, have long been
abandoned for their inherent unfairness and the dangers of
oppression that they engender. The same should be true about
access to the courtroom, upon which tax paying considerations
should have no bearing.
In Piper Aircraft, the Court found it reasonable to assume
that it would be more convenient to litigate a dispute in the
national courts of the plaintiff. 191 This assertion, however, may be
legitimately challenged. In fact, in Piper Aircraft itself, the foreign
plaintiffs brought the action in the defendant's home forum, at the
plaintiffs' own inconveniences. One may wonder why less
deference should be given to the foreign plaintiff's choice of forum
in such circumstances. The Court in Piper does not give further
justification for this convenience argument and if its holding was
based on discriminatory grounds rather than on mere convenience,
the Piper decision could be challenged as a violation of the equal
rights guaranteed by Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
192
Although this critique of forum non conveniens is justified, it
190. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 260-61; see Zhenjie, supra note 170, at 159-60; see also
Litman, supra note 173, at 575-76.
191. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255-56.
192. David Westin, Foreign Plaintiffs in Products Liability Actions: The Defense of
Forum Non Conveniens by Warren Freedman, 83 AM. J. INT'L .L. 438, 439-40 (1989)
(reviewing WARREN FREEDMAN, FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACTIONS: THE DEFENSE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS (1988)).
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must not cause the exclusion of the doctrine from the drafting of
an international regime. In fact, it does not challenge the whole
doctrine but only one aspect of its application. A single provision
in the international instrument that the courts may not
discriminate on the basis of the plaintiff's nationality in their
analysis would be theoretically sufficient to eradicate this
drawback.
Another argument against forum non conveniens focuses on
the reduced responsibility assumed by multinational corporations.
This critique, however, has an inherent shortcoming in the sense
that if cases like Union Carbide were not dismissed, the United
States would be exporting "its laws, policies, and social mores and
imposing them on sovereign foreign nations.'' 93 Damages awarded
by American juries would be substantially more important than
those that a foreign court would award, which would disrupt the
foreign court's policies. Developing countries seeking to attract
investors must accept the need to diminish these investors'
financial responsibility because of the "economic benefits which
flow from encouraging financial risk-taking and economic
innovation."'' 94 Low awards in those cases are an expression of this
acceptance by the foreign sovereign in order to attract foreign
corporations and stimulate economy. Although this may seem
shocking, it is a matter of national policy that an outsider cannot
challenge. Moreover, the amount of damages awarded in the
United States is assessed according to the American society, and
its general financial needs (such as the cost of cares). The same
amounts would not be appropriate for plaintiffs of developing
countries with different earnings and living expenses. This also
directly relates to the problem of accessibility and ability to
construe the foreign law designated by conflict of law rules.
American judges do not always have the linguistic, sociological,
and cultural background that would enable them to render
objective decisions.
Another critique is that the development of communication
and transportation has facilitated the availability of witnesses and
documents, and thus reduced the need for a forum non conveniens
approach. Yet the same evolution type argument can be used to
193. Carney, supra note 92, at 456.
194. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the
Prospects for an International Settlement, 20 TEX. INT'L L. J. 321, 324 (1985).
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support the position that it is now easier for plaintiffs to file a suit
in an inappropriate forum. The Union Carbide case has shown that
thanks to modern means of transportation and communication,
poor inhabitants of the Bhopal suburbs were able to bring claims
of up to $50 billion in the United States. 95 Consequently, the
argument that the forum non conveniens doctrine is less relevant
today does not seem conclusive.
Therefore, two of the critiques have obvious shortcomings.
The doctrine is still relevant today despite the reduction in today's
world of possible inconveniences; and the unfairness created by
the use of the doctrine by MNCs is balanced by the necessity to
restrain from imposing U.S. policies over other nations. The
critique of the unjustified discrimination based on the nationality
of the plaintiff is a relevant one that needs to be taken into
consideration and thus prevented. It should not, however,
jeopardize the use of a forum non conveniens element in the future
international regime. The two other critiques regarding excessive
judicial discretion and the unpredictability that it generates are
more problematic with regards to the inclusion of the doctrine in
an international instrument on jurisdiction and judgments. Yet
these drawbacks seem to be outweighed by the policy
considerations which support the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, and its crucial role in the legal systems that apply it.
3. Policy Considerations Supporting the Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens
Different policy rationales may be identified that justify the
forum non conveniens doctrine. The categories that follow are not
hermetical and often one factor considered by a court in a forum
non conveniens analysis may very well serve two different policies.
i. Convenience to the Courts
This policy focuses on the efficient allocation of judicial
resources. When dealing with unrelated cases, courts may face
complex conflict of laws questions. This policy was expressed by
the court in Gulf Oil Corp. when it stated that "[t]here is an
appropriateness.., in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum
that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather
195. See Rajeev Dhavan, For Whom? And For What? Reflections on the Legal
Aftermath of Bhopal, 20 TEX. INT'L L. J. 295 (1985).
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than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in
conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself."
' 19 6
Another advantage of forum non conveniens, which serves
the policy of convenience to the courts, is that it helps solve the
problem of crowded dockets. This interest is mentioned later as an
independent policy.
ii. Convenience to the Parties
In Gulf Oil Corp., the Court pointed out that litigation can
present a number of practical problems. Among those problems
are access to proof, availability of witnesses, and the possibility to
view premises. 197 This policy of convenience to the parties requires
the court to adopt a "balance of conveniences" test.198 The concern
is not that the litigation might be inconvenient to the plaintiff, who
chose the forum and thus accepted possible inconveniences, but
rather that the defendant should not be forced to litigate in a
clearly inconvenient forum. The Gulf Oil Corp. Court made it
clear by stating that the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be
disturbed unless she chose a forum in order to "'vex,' 'harass,' or
'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble
not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy."'199
iii. Fairness to the Community: Jury Duty
The forum non conveniens doctrine also serves a policy that
"[j]ury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon people
of a community which has no relation to the litigation. '' 200 This
policy focuses both on the unfairness of imposing costly and time-
consuming jury duty on a community having no relationship to the
dispute, and on the risk of confusion and misunderstandings that
may result from the application of foreign standards by local
juries.20 '
This policy may seem less relevant from an international
perspective than from a national one. In fact, a large number of
legal systems have abolished or restricted jury trials which are
196. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 509.
197. Id. at 508. For a British case referring to the availability of witnesses, see Spiliada
Maritime Corp., [1987] A.C. at 476.
198. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256 n. 23.
199. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508.
200. See id. at 508-09.
201. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 243-244.
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often seen as an inefficient method of reaching judgments. Out of
the four countries that we have studied, only the United States still
uses jury trials extensively. France, Germany, and England have
sharply reduced this device. Nevertheless, this policy is a legitimate
one for the United States, which is a major participant to The
Hague negotiations and should therefore be taken into
consideration in the drafting process.
iv. Preventing Docket Congestion
The policy of preventing docket congestion is a category that
is directly related to some of the policies previously mentioned.
For instance, it will be a factor of convenience to the courts but
also a factor of fairness to the community. Indeed, unrelated
litigation may cause delays in the treatment of the community
cases and thus impose an unfair burden on community members.
This major problem was pointed out by the dissent in the Texas
Supreme Court Dow Chemical case in these terms: "'Bhopal'-type
litigation, with little or no connection to Texas will add to our
already crowded dockets, forcing our residents to wait in the
corridors of our courthouses while foreign causes of action are
tried., 20 2 The doctrine of forum non conveniens is therefore crucial
for magnet fora, such as the United States.
American courts are a classic target of forum shopping
because "[s]imply put, compared with other foreign courts, United
States forums offer a plaintiff both lower costs and higher
recovery. ' ' 20 3 Litigation costs are low because the American
contingent fee system allows litigants with limited financial means
to bring actions they could not otherwise afford. This system,
which juries know, leaves only a certain percentage of the damages
to litigants, and along with the high American living standards and
the poor social safety net, contribute to the high damages awarded
by U.S. courts.2° This explains why American courts are a good
place to "shop in."
It results from what precedes that forum non conveniens,
although not perfect, has a role to play in a future international
202. Dow Chem. Co., 786 S.W.2d at 690.
203. Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29
TEX. INT'L L. J. 321, 323 (1994).
204. See Russell J. Weintraub, The United States as a Magnet Forum and What, If
Anything, to Do About It, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION
OF FORUM SELECTION 213, 216-17 (Jack L. Goldsmith ed., 1986).
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convention on jurisdiction and judgments, be it the current
proposed Hague Convention or another future proposal. All the
policies underlying the doctrine are legitimate ones and cannot be
ignored in drafting a fair international regime.
V. APPROACHING A COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF DECLINING
JURISDICTION
The following is an evaluation of the compromise that was
achieved in the Hague Convention negotiations. However,
considering that the scope of this study is not limited to the Hague
Compromise but rather that it intends to be used as a basis for
future projects, an attempt to determine what would be an ideal
system, if any, to deal with the question of declining jurisdiction,
should be free from historical and ideological backgrounds.
A. An Ideal Provision for Declining Jurisdiction
1. The Goals
The previous section of this article demonstrated that both
doctrines are important. Although imperfect, they both serve
legitimate goals. Therefore, an ideal system must create a balance
between the need for some judicial discretion, enabling judges to
work towards a fair and efficient administration of justice, and the
necessity that legal predictability remain unaffected by this
discretion. The idea is to take the best of all the systems we have
studied while attempting to neutralize their drawbacks.
Reaching a compromise between two apparently conflicting
positions requires participants to identify areas of common
interests. Both common law and civil law systems recognize the
need to prevent useless litigation conducted simultaneously in two
fora. Lack of such provisions would lead to a waste of time and
money if the same outcome were decided by both Courts and a
useless complication if the courts reach two conflicting decisions.
Therefore, the ideal solution must provide that when the same
parties are engaged in proceedings based on the same cause of
action, one of the courts seized shall suspend its proceedings. The
question that arises is which of the two courts (first or second
seized) should be given priority.
It seems that a first-in-time rule to determine which court
should suspend its proceedings is the most appropriate solution. A
provision giving priority to the second court seized would not be
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
supported by any particular needs and would only cause a waste of
the time and expenses already incurred in the first court seized.
Therefore, the text would provide that the second court seized
shall suspend the proceedings.
At this stage, such a clause would closely resemble the lis
pendens provisions as applied by civil law countries. Nevertheless,
I have mentioned that a civil law lis pendens provision causes a
"race to the court" and thus endangers the fairness of the
20process. 05 Consequently, the ideal system would not be a pure
civil law lis pendens provision. It should include a mechanism
enabling the judge to consider the fairness of the process and the
appropriateness of the forum, thus including elements of the
forum non conveniens doctrine.
However, here comes the crucial question of how to articulate
the two elements. Should the forum non conveniens element be a
separate mechanism or part of the lis pendens clause? Creating a
system with a separate forum non conveniens provision would
effectively balance the lis pendens clause, but would leave the
judge with discretion to decline jurisdiction, even absent parallel
proceedings. This possibility resuscitates the risk of
unpredictability. On the contrary, including the forum non
conveniens element into, and as an exception to, the lis pendens
clause would solve the inherent unfairness of lis pendens and
simultaneously provide results that would be predictable enough
for the parties to foresee possible judicial outcomes.
2. Drafting the Ideal Provision
The essence of a provision for an international convention on
the issue of declining jurisdiction could therefore be drafted as
follows:
When the same parties are engaged in proceedings based on the
same cause of action in courts of different contracting states, the
second court seized shall suspend the proceedings.
Paragraph (1) does not apply, if the first court seized finds, on
application by a party, that it is a clearly inappropriate forum
and that the second court seized would be a clearly more
appropriate forum.
If the second court seized has already suspended its proceedings
205. See Herzog, supra note 165, at 379.
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pursuant to paragraph (1), it shall proceed with the case if the
condition set forth in paragraph (2) is met.
The two prongs of the test set forth in paragraph 2 must be
cumulative. Thus, if the forum seized considers the alternative
court clearly more appropriate but does not find itself clearly
inappropriate, the case will still be tried in an appropriate,
although not the most appropriate, forum. If the first court seized
considers that it is a clearly inappropriate forum, but that the
second court seized is not a clearly more appropriate forum, the
case would be tried in the least inappropriate of the two fora. The
defendant would still have a chance to bring the case before a
clearly more appropriate forum and then move to have the first
court seized decline jurisdiction in favor of the other forum.
Although this system deprives a court of its ability to decline
jurisdiction absent parallel proceedings, it would still solve the
problem of crowded dockets in magnet fora. Indeed, defendants
would still be given a chance to invoke the inappropriateness of
the forum. They would only have to take the case before the
natural forum and then bring a motion under paragraphs (2) or (3)
to have the first court seized decline jurisdiction. The burden on
defendants of bringing another suit in the appropriate forum does
not seem unreasonable considering the potential gains that would
result for them.
This system would also solve the problem of the race to the
court by providing a better consideration of the forum's
appropriateness. Thus, the race by a natural defendant to an
inconvenient court for the sole purpose of neutralizing a plaintiff
would be pointless, provided that the seized by the natural
defendant objectively recognizes itself inappropriate. The risk that
the court first seized would not declare itself a clearly
inappropriate forum, where it objectively should, would be left to
the control of international comity and to the fact that a court so
violating the spirit of the convention would place itself in a
position where other courts in a reversed case would do alike.
B. Comments on the Hague Compromise
The compromise found at the Hague is not similar to the
above proposed provisions. The negotiations resulted in a system
including elements of both lis pendens and forum non conveniens
but in two separate articles.
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1. The Lis Pendens Element: Article 21 of the Interim Text
The first part of this system is Article 21 of the Interim Text,
which reads as follows:
1.When the same parties are engaged in proceedings in courts
of different Contracting States and when such proceedings are
based on the same causes of action, irrespective of the relief
sought, the court second seised shall suspend the proceedings if
the court first seised has jurisdiction under Articles [white list]
[or under a rule of national law which is consistent with these
articles] and is expected to render a judgment capable of being
recognised under the Convention in the State of the court
second seised, unless the latter has exclusive jurisdiction under
Article 4 [11] or 12.
2.The court second seised shall decline jurisdiction as soon as it
is presented with a judgment rendered by the court first seised
that complies with the requirements for recognition or
enforcement under the Convention.
3.Upon application of a party, the court second seised may
proceed with the case if the plaintiff in the court first seised has
failed to take the necessary steps to bring the proceedings to a
decision on the merits or if that court has not rendered such a
decision within a reasonable time.
4.The provisions of the preceding paragraphs apply to the court
second seised even in a case where the jurisdiction of that court
is based on the national law of that State in accordance with
Article 17.
5.For the purpose of this Article, a court shall be deemed to be
seised
a) when the document instituting the proceedings or an
equivalent document is lodged with the court; or
b) if such document has to be served before being lodged with
the court, when it is received by the authority responsible for
service or served on the defendant.
[As appropriate, universal time is applicable.]
6.If in the action before the court first seised the plaintiff seeks
a determination that it has no obligation to the defendant, and
if an action seeking substantive relief is brought in the court
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second seised
a) the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 5 above shall not apply to
the court second seised; and
b) the court first seised shall suspend the proceedings at the
request of a party if the court second seised is expected to
render a decision capable of being recognised under the
Convention.
7. This Article shall not apply if the court first seised, on
application by a party, determines that the court second seised
is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute, under the
conditions specified in Article 22.
In brief, this provision is a lis pendens clause, which states that
where the same parties are engaged in proceedings based on the
same causes of action, the court second seized (court B) shall
suspend the proceedings if the court first seized (court A) has
jurisdiction under the convention and if the judgment of court A is
expected to be recognized later in the state of court B.2 °6 Article 21
of the Interim text is therefore a classic lis pendens clause. The
formulation of the clause is similar to the German system in that it
expressly requires identity of the parties and identity of the cause
of action.20 7 This consequently avoids the vagueness of the French
"same dispute" standard.0 8 The requirement is even further
clarified by a statement that the relief sought by the parties is
irrelevant to the question of whether the parties are engaged in
proceedings based on the same cause of action.20 9 Thus, an action
brought in France seeking damages for breach of contract and an
action brought in England seeking specific performance for the
same breach of contract will be governed by Article 21.
Certain elements have been added to this classic lis pendens
rule to ensure an efficient system and to avoid the drawbacks that
were previously noted.210 The major problem of a lis pendens
clause is that it encourages a race to the court. Natural defendants
may be tempted to bring a negative suit in a forum more favorable
206. See Gaudernet-Tallon, supra note 65, at 181.
207. See id. at 197.
208. See id. at 180-81.
209. See id. at 199.
210. See id. at 180-81.
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to their position and inconvenient for the natural plaintiff in order
to block the proceedings. This problem is efficiently dealt with in
the Interim text. Article 21(6) states that if the action brought in
court A seeks a determination that the plaintiff has no obligation
to the defendant, and if an action seeking substantive relief is
brought in court B, then court B does not have to suspend its
proceedings.211 To ensure that the lis pendens mechanism will not
result in the suit being lost in a court, article 21(3) states that court
B may proceed with the case if the plaintiff in court A has not
taken the necessary steps to bring the proceedings to a decision on
the merits or if court A has not decided on the merits within a
reasonable time.212 Eventually the lis pendens clause is balanced by
article 21(7) which states that it does not apply if court A finds that
court B is a clearly more appropriate forum to resolve the
dispute.213 Thus, the clause includes the consideration of the
appropriateness element. It differs, however, from the system that
we described in the previous part in the sense that article 21(7)
refers to a separate article: article 22.
2. A Separate Forum Non Conveniens Element: Article 22 of the
Interim Text
Article 22 of the Interim text is entitled "Exceptional
circumstances for declining jurisdiction" and reads as follows:
1.In exceptional circumstances, when the jurisdiction of the
court seised is not founded on an exclusive choice of court
agreement valid under Article 4, or on Article 7, 8 or 12, the
court may, on application by a party, suspend its proceedings if
in that case it is clearly inappropriate for that court to exercise
jurisdiction and if a court of another State has jurisdiction and is
clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute. Such
application must be made no later than at the time of the first
defense on the merits.
2.The court shall take into account, in particular:
a) any inconvenience to the parties in view of their habitual
residence;
211. Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, Interim Text, art. 21(6).
212. Id. at art. 21(3).
213. Id. at art. 21(7).
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b) the nature and location of the evidence, including
documents and witnesses, and the procedures for obtaining
such evidence;
c) applicable limitation or prescription periods;
d) the possibility of obtaining recognition and enforcement of
any decision on the merits.
3.In deciding whether to suspend the proceedings, a court shall
not discriminate on the basis of the nationality or habitual
residence of the parties.
4.If the court decides to suspend its proceedings under
paragraph 1, it may order the defendant to provide security
sufficient to satisfy any decision of the other court on the
merits. However, it shall make such an order if the other court
has jurisdiction only under Article 17, or if it is in a non-
Contracting State, unless the defendant establishes that [the
plaintiffs ability to enforce the judgment will not be materially
prejudiced if such an order is not made] [sufficient assets exist
in the State of that other court or in another State where the
court's decision could be enforced].
5.When the court has suspended its proceedings under
paragraph 1,
a)it shall decline to exercise jurisdiction if the court of the other
State exercises jurisdiction, or if the plaintiff does not bring the
proceedings in that State within the'time specified by the court;
or
b) it shall proceed with the case if the court of the other State
decides not to exercise jurisdiction.
In brief, Article 22 states that the court may, on application
by a party, suspend its proceedings if it is clearly inappropriate for
that court to exercise jurisdiction and if a court of another state
has jurisdiction and is clearly more appropriate to resolve the
dispute.1 4 Being a mechanism in itself, Article 22 is applicable
even absent a situation of parallel proceedings. Therefore, judges
are given discretionary power to decline jurisdiction for a goal
other than preventing the problems of simultaneous proceedings
214. Id.
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in two different fora. This discretionary power is enhanced by the
use of the word "may" instead of "shall" in Article 22(1).
However, Article 22 is drafted in a manner that limits the
drawbacks of the forum non conveniens doctrine. The first of the
restricting aspects of the clause is that the interim text explicitly
limits the use of article 22 to "exceptional circumstances.,
215
Secondly, the text grants the court the power to suspend the
proceedings and not to dismiss them.216 This mitigates the outcome
determinative effect of the mechanism which was previously
addressed in this study.217 Indeed, it allows resumption of the
action if the "most appropriate" forum does not exercise
jurisdiction. 21 8 But the outcome determinative effect is not
completely neutralized. When the court has suspended its
proceedings pursuant to article 22(1), it is bound to decline
jurisdiction even if the plaintiff does not bring the case in the
"most appropriate" forum.21 9 Thus, it ensures that a corporation
like Union Carbide, for instance, will eventually assume
responsibility for its acts even if the plaintiffs cannot bring the suit
in the appropriate forum. Nevertheless, this provision is justified in
the sense that absent such a statement, plaintiffs would voluntarily
fail to bring the suit and wait to have the case resumed by the first
court.
The discretion of the courts in applying article 22 is also
limited by the test which must be verified by the forum seized.
Three conditions must be looked at separately: (1) the court must
find itself a clearly inappropriate forum, (2) the alternative forum
must have jurisdiction to hear the case, and (3) the alternative
forum must be clearly more appropriate. A finding that the
alternative forum may be "clearly more appropriate" does not
necessarily mean that the forum seized is itself "clearly
inappropriate." Thus, the mechanism ensures that the case will be
tried either in an appropriate forum, although possibly not in the
most appropriate forum, or in the least inappropriate forum.
Article 22(2) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that the
forum seized may consider in determining whether it should
215. Id. at art. 22(1).
216. Id.
217. See supra IV(B)(1).
218. Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, Interim Text, art. 22(1).
219. Id.
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suspend its proceedings or not.220 An exhaustive list would
certainly have better satisfied representatives of the civil law
tradition in the negotiations inasmuch as it would have limited the
wide discretion that judges enjoy in dealing with the
appropriateness of the two fora. However, the use in Article 22 of
the words "in particular, 221 implies that the list is only given an
illustrative value and can therefore be extended.
Improvements could be made to the provision. For instance,
the interesting solution of the Piper Aircraft decision222 could be
reflected in a paragraph stating that the court cannot consider the
possibly less favorable change in the law unless the remedy
provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or
unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all. This could potentially
create discrimination on the basis of nationality and thus conflict
with article 22(3), which states that courts may not discriminate on
the basis of the nationality or habitual residence of the parties in
deciding whether to suspend the proceedings, but it would
enhance the fairness of the mechanism. An exception to article
22(3) could thus be added to take this change into consideration.
A clarification should also be made in the wording of article
22, which states that the court can suspend the proceedings on
application by a "party. '223 By referring to a "party," the text
implies that both defendants and plaintiffs can bring a motion
under article 22 which can be justly criticized. A motion by a
plaintiff, who by definition opted for the forum, would seem
clearly abusive and could be used as a tool to complicate the
process by slowing it down and causing additional costs for a
defendant. A plaintiff could thus force the defendant into a
disadvantageous settlement of their dispute, the only motive of the
defendant being to avoid additional litigation costs generated by
the litigation of the forum non conveniens question artificially
raised by the plaintiff. Therefore, a reformulation of the article to
specify that the motion can only be brought by a defendant would
avoid these abuses.
Despite these possible improvements, article 22 of the Interim
text is a good mechanism giving the courts a chance to compensate
the possible unfairness created by the lis pendens clause.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 235.
223. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
From two apparently conflicting doctrines was conceived, in
the Hague Compromise, an efficient system which combines the
need for legal predictability and the necessity to take into
consideration the fairness of the process. At the present stage, the
Hague negotiations on this issue have been abandoned in favor of
a narrower text. Nevertheless, the need for a convention on
jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments is not itself affected by
the problems encountered in the Hague negotiations. It is
inevitable that new proposals will be drafted in the future in order
to eventually achieve what eminent international lawyers have
endeavored to build for decades: a comprehensive and efficient
international regime on jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments. One can thus only encourage its future drafters to take
advantage of the tremendous work that was done in the context of
the Hague negotiations on the question of declining jurisdiction.
Certain minor changes could be made which seem acceptable to
both legal traditions and would only benefit the administration of
justice. Nevertheless, the compromise reached in the Hague
negotiations establishes a good balance between common law and
civil law positions on judicial discretion. Both sides have made
concessions and the result is a theoretically efficient system. The
word "theoretically" is here meant to emphasize the fact that the
practicality of the compromise will not be fully ascertained until
national courts actually apply it. Courts of common law countries
will need to accommodate the reduced discretion resulting from
such compromise and, similarly, courts of civil law countries will
have to adapt to the new notion of "appropriateness of the forum"
and give more consideration to the fairness of the process.
The success of a possible future convention on jurisdiction
and judgments in civil and commercial matters, be it the present
Hague Proposed Convention or another future convention, will
also depend on its binding character and uniform application. The
convention will thus need to be better treated than previous
international agreements. The U.S. Supreme Court's approach to
the Hague Evidence Convention in the Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale224 case is an example of this problem
which grounded an argument that it is possible "to doubt the
224. Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 552
(1987) (holding that the Hague Evidence Convention is merely an optional instrument).
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Court's willingness to recognize and abide by the international
character of a jurisdiction and enforcement convention.,
225
Nevertheless, a successful outcome in negotiating an international
instrument on jurisdiction and judgments would still constitute a
major improvement and serve the administration of justice by
harmonizing conflicting regimes, a goal that deserves every
exertion participating countries are willing to use in the drafting
process.
225. Joachim Zekoll, The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague Judgments
Convention Project, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1283, 1285 (1998).

